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1. Introduction
Considering the political and scientiﬁc debates on labor market and family
policies, we realize that, with regards to the labor supply side, both policies are
closely interweaved: When parents decide as to whether they supply work or
not, and, if so, to what extent, they have to make sure that their children are
adequately supervised and receive a good education. Hence, the issues of com-
patibility between labor market participation and labor supply, on the one hand,
and of availability of child care services and child education, on the other, cannot
be separated. Rather, economists dealing with either side should always take the
other side into account as well. — Ideally, an integrated approach treating both
sides equally seems to be most desirable.
In the empirical literature the relationship and the interdependencies between
family structure, labor supply, and child care demand have already been exten-
sively explored. Pioneering papers on the economics of child care are, for example,
Becker and Lewis (1973), Becker and Tomes (1976), and Heckman (1974). The
ﬁrst two papers study the eﬀect of family income on fertility in a quantity-quality
model of children, and the last paper analyzes the relationship between labor
supply and child care. Subsequent to the study of Heckman, a large number of
empirical studies explores the eﬀect of child care cost on labor supply; most of
them ﬁnd this eﬀect to be negative.
1
While the empirical literature on the relationship between labor supply de-
cisions and child care is vast, only few theoretical papers deal with this issue.
Notable contributions are Bergstrom and Blomquist (1996), who discuss public
provision of child care services and examine the preferred level of child care sub-
sidies, and Brink and Nordblom (2005), who analyze the eﬀects of various child
care subsidies on parental time allocation. Other authors focus on the parents’
choice between private and public child care. Examples are Lundholm and Ohls-
son (1998), who are concerned with mechanisms similar to those in Bergstrom and
Blomquist (1996), and Lundholm and Ohlsson (2002), who generalize the result
of Becker and Lewis (1973).
1See, for example, Averett et al. (1997), Blau and Hagy (1998), Blau and Robins (1988),
Connelly (1992), and Ribar (1992). Only a few authors conclude diﬀerently. For example,
Michalopoulos et al. (1992) and Baum (2002) ﬁnd the cost eﬀect to be close to zero or positive,
respectively.2
Even though the few extant theoretical papers represent valuable ﬁrst steps to-
wards a thorough modeling, they exhibit substantial drawbacks. Most importantly
they do not endogenize labor supply, leisure, and child care decisions simultane-
ously; nor do they investigate this inherently intertemporal issue in a dynamic
setting. — We would like to correct for these shortcomings and to ﬁll the gap
in the theoretical literature by developing a dynamic model where labor supply,
leisure and child care demand are determined endogenously at each instant of
time. We apply this framework to scrutinize how the government may interfere
with parental labor supply and child care decisions by means of either diﬀerent fee
structures for public child care services or by altering the quality of public child
care.
We chose a one parent–one child household approach with an altruistic par-
ent. The single parent–one child model is chosen not because we believe this is the
representative family structure, but because it is both an empirically signiﬁcant
family structure and it allows us to capture the most important interdependen-
cies between labor supply and child care decisions without letting the number of
endogenous variables increase prohibitively, which would have been the case had
we included a second parent and possibly even a second child. The two-person
model, though, can be solved without putting too much structure into it, and may
thus be viewed as a ﬁrst step into the direction of a more sophisticated household
model. In fact, our approach allows us to characterize the optimal path of the
parent’s decision variables, and also to investigate the impact of public policies on
the parent’s behavior at a remarkably general level.
Deriving the parent’s utility-maximizing controls, we show that in the course
of time, i.e., as the child gets older, parental labor supply and correspondingly the
demand for public child care services increases. Yet, an extension of the parent’s
time horizon, interpreted as a longer education period, decreases both the path of
labor supply and of the demand for public child care. Given the behavior of the
parent, we then consider various possible public policies. First, the government
may levy a fee on public child care, which is either proportional to the parent’s
income (income-based fee), or proportional to the consumption of public child care
(use-based fee), or equals a ﬁxed fee which has to be paid if public child care is used
at some instant of time. We demonstrate that these fee systems have quite diﬀerent
eﬀects on labor supply, on the demand for public child care, on leisure time spent
with and without the child, and ﬁnally, and probably most importantly, on the3
child’s performance (or education) level. Thus, the three fee systems are far from
being equivalent. In particular, we show that an increase in any of these user fees
generally results in opposite eﬀects on labor supply and the child’s performance
level.
Remarkably, this trade oﬀ between labor supply and the child’s performance
continues to hold even if we consider, as an alternative public policy, a direct
enhancement of the quality of public child care services. While an improvement
of public child care leads to an increase in parental labor supply and in public
child care demand, it decreases the path of the child’s performance level — a
phenomenon which is at variance with immediate intuition, but can be explained
quite well.
We conclude that, given our assumptions, public policy frequently faces a
trade oﬀ between encouraging labor supply and enhancing the child’s educational
path. Only for a small use-based fee does this conﬂict not emerge, and labor market
and education targets may be met simultaneously. It is therefore important for
policy makers to be aware of the remarkably diverging consequences of diﬀerent
policies. Ignoring these trade oﬀs and the subtle diﬀerences of these policies on
parental behavior and the child’s well-being, a well-meant policy may easily go
wrong.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we set up the
parent’s intertemporal optimization problem, which we then solve in Section 3. We
characterize the path of the optimal leisure, labor supply, and child care decisions
and show how these decisions depend on the crucial parameters of the model in
Section 4. The impact of diﬀerent fee systems and of the quality of public child
care on the parent’s behavior is scrutinized in Section 5. The resulting eﬀect of
these policies on the child’s performance is then investigated in Section 6. As we
shall see, a more rigorous analysis of the use-based fee system is required; this is
done in Section 7, where we put more structure in the model. Finally we consider
the possibility of corner solutions in Section 8, before we summarize our results in
Section 9.
2. The Model
We model a parent’s decision, who has a child, and must allocate his/her dis-
posable time, which we normalize to unity, to either working, pure leisure (leisure
time without the child), or child care activities (leisure time together with the4
child). The instantaneous welfare of the parent depends on consumption, leisure
time with and without the child, and on the performance (or well-being) of the
child, and is represented by a utility function
F(x(t),l(t),c(t),b(t)) := u(x(t)) + v(l(t),c(t)) + w(b(t)), (1)
where x(t) denotes consumption of some unspeciﬁed aggregate consumption bundle
in period t, l(t) represents the amount of leisure time spent without the child, c(t) is
the leisure time spent with the child (or parental child care), and b(t) represents the
child’s well-being, education level, or performance. With respect to the subutility
functions u,v, and w we assume the following.
(i) u : R+ → R is continuous, u0 and u00 exist on R++, u0 > 0, u00 < 0, and
u0(x) → ∞ as x → 0+.
(ii) v : I2 → R is continuous, vl, vc, vll, vlc, and vcc exist on
◦
I2, vl > 0, vc > 0,
vll < 0, vcc < 0, vllvcc − (vlc)2 > 0, vl(l,c) → ∞ as l → 0+, vc(l,c) → ∞ as
c → 0+, and for some suﬃciently small positive constant n1 : vlc > −n1,
that is, vlc is bounded from below.
(iii) w : R+ → R is continuous, w0 and w00 exist on R++, w0 > 0, and w00 < 0.
We use the following notation throughout the paper: R+ ≡ [0,∞); R++ ≡ (0,∞);
I ≡ [0,1];
◦
I ≡ (0,1); a prime means diﬀerentiation; a subscript denotes the variable
with respect to which the partial derivative is taken.
We treat the child’s performance b(t) as a stock variable to which both
parental and public child care contribute. Thus, the pure process of growing
up, ˙ b(t) = g(b(t)), b(0) = b0 > 0, may be enhanced by instantaneous child care
activities. We assume that parental child care, measured in eﬃciency units, is
equal to the leisure time spent together with the child, c(t), while public child
care consumption, measured in eﬃciency units, is proportional to the amount of
public child care consumption (measured in hours), d(t), and is thus given by
y(t) ≡ qd(t). Here the productivity parameter q > 0 represents the quality (or
intensity) of public child care. This formulation allows us to investigate the impact
of, say, a higher kindergarten or school quality on the parent’s leisure and labor
supply decisions.
Altogether, the compound eﬀect of both private and public child care (mea-
sured in eﬃciency units) on the rate at which a child’s education or, more broadly,
its performance is enhanced, may be characterized by a production function f :
I × R+ → R : (c,y) 7→ f(c,y), and the evolution of b(t) is, thus, governed by the5
diﬀerential equation
˙ b(t) = f(c(t),y(t)) g(b(t)). (2)
Note that according to this speciﬁcation parental and public child care are im-
perfect substitutes in the educational production function. This represents a sub-
stantial generalization of the simple linear technology, where (child) quality is
proportional to the sum of parental and public child care (measured in hours),
predominantly used in the literature (see, for example, Lundholm and Ohlsson
(2002)). With regard to the production functions f and g, we assume the follow-
ing.
(iv) f : I × R+ → R is continuous, fc, fy, fcc, fcy, and fyy exist on
◦
I × R++,
f(0,0) 6 1, fc > 0, fy > 0, fcc 6 0, fyy 6 0, fccfyy −fcy > 0, and, for some
suﬃciently small positive constant n2, fcy > −n2, that is, fcy is bounded
from below.
(v) g : R+ → R+ is continuous, g0 and g00 exist on R++, g(0) = 0, g0 > 0, and
g00 6 0.
Since the parent may devote his/her disposable time to either working, pure
leisure, or child care, labor supply is endogenized. For simplicity we assume that
at any point in time the parent may ﬁnd a job suitable to meet his/her labor
supply decision, h(t) := 1 − l(t) − c(t) ∈ I, at the actual (real) wage rate ω > 0.
Thus, the parent’s time constraint reads as
h(t) + l(t) + c(t) = 1, (3)
and the total time of child care must be equal to the amount of disposable time:
c(t) + d(t) = 1. (4)
At each instant of time, total expenditure on consumption and public child
care must meet labor income. Normalizing the price of the consumption bundle
to unity, the instantaneous budget constraint of the parent is given by
x(t) + φ(d(t),M(t)) = ωh(t) ≡ M(t), (5)
where φ : I × R+ → R : (d,M) 7→ φ(d,M) represents the public child care fee
which may, in principle, depend on both the consumption of public child care
and the parent’s income, M(t). To be more speciﬁc, we assume the following fee
structure.6
(vi) φ : I × R+ → R+ is deﬁned by φ(d(t),M(t)) := αM(t)1d(t)>0 + βd(t) +
γ1d(t)>0, 1 > α > 0, β > 0, and γ > 0,
where 1A represents the indicator function, yielding 1 if A is true and 0 otherwise.
The parameters α, β, and γ are regarded as the income ‘tax rate’, the price for
public child care (per unit of time), and a ﬁxed user fee for public child care,
respectively. In what follows, we discuss the following (pure) fee structures
income-based fee: φα(d(t),M(t);α) := αM(t)1d(t)>0,
use-based fee: φβ(d(t);β) := βd(t),
ﬂat fee: φγ(d(t);γ) := γ1d(t)>0.
(These fee schemes have also been studied by Brink and Nordblom (2005),
though in a static framework.)
Let T denote the ﬁxed time horizon, which may be interpreted as the age at
which the child no longer requires child care. Finally, we assume that the present
value of the child’s performance at the ﬁxed end of the child care period is given
by ψ(b(T)) := ²w(b(T))e−rT. Here ² > 0 is the weight parameter and r > 0 is the






u(x(t)) + v(l(t),c(t)) + w(b(t))
¤
e
−rt dt + ²w(b(T))e
−rT,
s.t. ˙ b(t) = f(c(t),y(t))g(b(t)),
y(t) = q d(t),
h(t) + l(t) + c(t) = 1,
c(t) + d(t) = 1,
x(t) + αM(t)1d(t)>0 + βd(t) + γ1d(t)>0 = M(t),
M(t) = ωh(t),
(x(t),l(t),c(t),d(t),h(t)) ∈ R+ × I
4,
b(0) = b




The parent maximizes his/her intertemporal (altruistic) utility with respect to
consumption, pure leisure time, private child care, public child care, and labor
supply subject to the motion of the child’s education level, the time constraints,
the budget constraint, and the boundary constraints.7
3. Intertemporal Child Care Demand and Labor Supply
In this section, we solve the parent’s problem. First, to make the problem
more tractable, we reduce the dimension of the problem by using the constraints
(3)–(5) together with (vi). This allows us to eliminate the controls c,l, and x, and













s.t. ˙ b = f(1 − d,qd)g(b), (7)
1 > d > 0, d > h, h > (βd + γ1d>0)/ω
α, (8)
b(0) = b
0 > 0, b
0 ﬁxed, (9)
b(T) > 0, (10)
T ﬁxed, (11)
where ωα ≡ (1−α1d>0)ω > 0 is the after-tax real wage rate. In order for constraint
(8) to be meaningful, we assume ωα > β + γ.
In this problem, the Hamiltonian, H, given below, is not necessarily concave
in (b,d,h), implying that H does not to satisfy the Mangasarian-type suﬃciency
condition (see, e.g., Seierstad and Sydsæter (1987)) frequently used in the litera-
ture. In order to solve the problem, though, we proceed with the following steps.
We provide a condition under which the maximum principle yields a unique can-
didate for optimality. We then show that the conditions of the Filippov-Cesari
existence theorem are satisﬁed, thereby establishing the existence of an optimal
triple (b∗(t),d∗(t),h∗(t)). We therefore conclude that the unique candidate pro-
duced by the maximum principle is indeed optimal. These results are shown in
Appendix A. Eventually we arrive at the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Consider the problem (6)–(11) together with Assumptions (i)–(v)
and ωα > β+γ. If w0(b)g(b) = C, C a positive constant, then there exists a unique
optimal triple (b∗(t),d∗(t),h∗(t)) such that b∗(t) > 0, 1 > d∗(t) > 0, d∗(t) > h∗(t),
and h∗(t) > (βd∗(t) + γ)/ωα for all t ∈ [0,T].
Proof. See Appendix A. ¤8
The assumption, w0(b)g(b) = C, simpliﬁes the proof that the maximum prin-
ciple provides a unique candidate for optimality.2 On the other hand, however, it
is also reasonable from an economic point of view, for it seems that, the lower the
child’s productivity (or ability) of self-development is, the more marginal utility
the parent derives from an improvement of the child’s performance.
4. Inspection of the Optimal Solution
We shall now investigate the properties of the optimal solution. This is done
in Propositions 2 and 3 which characterize the optimal path and the dependence
of the optimal solution on the time horizon, the discount rate, and the weight of
the child’s ﬁnal performance level at the end of the child care period.
Proposition 2. Consider the optimal triple of Proposition 1. The optimal control
(d∗(t),h∗(t),c∗(t),l∗(t)) has the following characteristics on times, t and T:
(A) (r² − 1)(fc − qfy) T 0 ⇔ ˙ d∗ S 0 ⇔ ˙ h∗ S 0 ⇔ ˙ c∗ T 0 ⇔ {˙ l∗ S 0, given
vlc = 0},
(B) (r² − 1)(fc − qfy) T 0 ⇔ d∗
T T 0 ⇔ h∗
T T 0 ⇔ c∗
T S 0 ⇔ {l∗
T T 0, given
vlc = 0},
where fc, fy, and vlc are evaluated along the optimal path.
Proof. See Appendix B. ¤
Most importantly, the time path of the demand for public child care and
labor supply hinges, beyond its dependence on the discount rate and the weight
of the child’s ultimate achievement level, on the productivity gap between private
and public child care, fc − qfy. Assume that the productivity of private child
care exceeds the productivity of public child care, and that the discount rate is
moderate, such that r² < 1. Then the demand for public child care and labor
supply are initially low and increase in the course of time, i.e., as the child grows
up. Correspondingly, leisure time spent together with the child decreases over
time, while the eﬀect on leisure time spent without the child is unclear in general.
Yet, for the special case when utility is separable between leisure time spent with
and without the child, vlc = 0, leisure time without the child is increasing over
time. This feature is consistent with common real-world observations: When a
child is born, labor supply frequently drops and the parent spends much of his/her
2This type of assumption and an example of a pair of functions satisfying the assumption,
provided in Section 6, have been presented by Xie (1991, 1997), though in diﬀerent settings.9
time together with the child. As it grows up, the child is sent to kindergarten
ﬁrst and to school later, implying that the amount of public child care increases
while the amount of private child care decreases over time. With more time left
at his/her discretion, the parent tends to increase labor supply and plausibly also
to spend more leisure time without the child.
Similarly, if the length of the education period is increased, labor supply and
the demand for public child care fall (under the assumption (r²−1)(fc−qfy) < 0),
implying an increase in leisure time spent together with the child and plausibly a
reduction in the leisure time spent without the child. The intuition is as follows.
With an extended education period the parent derives utility from the child’s
performance over a longer period of time, making (early) investment in the child’s
well-being more valuable. Thus, given that the productivity of private child care
exceeds that of public child care, the parent is willing to spend more leisure time
together with the child. — Interpreting T as the end of schooltime, we may
conclude that an increase in required total schooltime lowers the parent’s labor
supply but makes him/her spend more time together with the child at each instant
during the education period. Viewed from another perspective, suppose a parent
knew that his/her child will eventually visit high school (and thus T is large), the
parent would arguably invest a higher amount of time in educational activities
as compared to a child which is sure to leave school immediately at the end of
compulsory education.
Proposition 3. Consider the optimal triple of Proposition 1. The optimal control
(d∗(t),h∗(t),c∗(t),l∗(t)) has the following characteristics on the discount factor, r,
and the weight of the child’s ﬁnal education level, ²:
(A) fc − qfy T 0 ⇔ d∗
r T 0 ⇔ h∗
r T 0 ⇔ c∗
r S 0 ⇔ {l∗
r T 0, given vlc = 0},
(B) fc − qfy T 0 ⇔ d∗
² S 0 ⇔ h∗
² S 0 ⇔ c∗
² T 0 ⇔ {l∗
² S 0, given vlc = 0},
where fc, fy, and vlc are evaluated along the optimal path.
Proof. See Appendix B. ¤
In order to interpret this result, we begin with the eﬀect of a higher weight of
the child’s ultimate performance level in the parent’s intertemporal utility function.
Assume again, that the productivity of private child care exceeds the productivity
of public child care, fc − qfy > 0. With a higher value of ² the parent puts more
value on the child’s education performance at the end of the education period.
With a higher productivity of private child care, when compared with public child10
care, the opportunity cost of public child care, measured in forgone performance of
the child, increases with ². This makes the parent spend more time together with
the child and reduce his/her leisure time without the child; at the same time he/she
reduces the demand for public child care and cuts labor supply. In this respect
the eﬀect of an increase in ² is comparable with an extension of the education
period (increase in T). In both cases the parent becomes more concerned about
the child’s well-being resulting in a substitution away from all activities towards
leisure time spent together with the child.
The reverse argument applies when the discount rate increases. A higher
discount rate makes the present more valuable, when compared with the future.
Since the beneﬁts from education are (mainly) attributed to the future, while the
beneﬁt from consumption and pure leisure time is immediate, the parent substi-
tutes private by public child care in order to be able to increase both leisure time
without the child and labor supply. In this sense a more impatient (or more my-
opic) parent devotes less eﬀort in educational activities than a more patient (or
forward-looking) parent. Thus, the comparative static eﬀect of a parent becoming
more patient or more forward-looking (a decrease in r) is equivalent to the parent
becoming more concerned about the well-being of the child (an increase in ²).
5. Public Fee and Service Policies
Since we are not only interested in the optimal behavior of the parent, but
also and arguably more importantly, in the dependence of the optimal solution
on policy parameters, we seek to characterize the impact of public policy on child
care and labor market participation decisions in this section. In this way we
reveal some scope for an improvement of both family and labor market policies.
In this respect Proposition 4 provides a central result, as it shows the impact of
diﬀerent user-fee systems and of the eﬃciency of public child care on the demand
for private and public child care, pure leisure time, and labor supply. — To
formalize these results, we subsequently write ˆ f(d,q) instead of ˆ f(d) := f(1−d,qd)
and ˆ fdq = fy + yfyy − dfcy for the corresponding cross derivative.
Proposition 4. Consider the optimal triple of Proposition 1. The optimal control
(d∗(t),h∗(t),c∗(t),l∗(t)) has the following characteristics on policy parameters, α,
β, γ, and q:
(A) If φ := φα, then −x∗u00/u0 T 1 ⇔ d∗
α T 0 ⇔ h∗
α T 0 ⇔ c∗
α S 0 ⇔ l∗
α S 0,




β are not clear,11
(C) If φ := φγ, then d∗
γ > 0, h∗
γ > 0, c∗
γ < 0, and l∗
γ < 0,
(D) ˆ fdq T 0 ⇔ d∗
q T 0 ⇔ h∗
q T 0 ⇔ c∗
q S 0 ⇔ {l∗
q T 0, given vlc = 0},
where u0, u00, ˆ fdq, and vlc are evaluated along the optimal path.
Proof. See Appendix C. ¤
Proposition 4 illustrates how the government may interfere with the parent’s
child care and labor market decisions by changing either the fees levied on income
and on the use of public child care or by changing the quality of public child
care services. If public child care is ﬁnanced by an income-based fee, φ = φα, a
higher fee (or tax), α, decreases labor supply and the demand for public child care,
provided that the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption, −x∗u00/u0, is
not too large; and it correspondingly increases leisure time both with and without
the child. Only if this elasticity exceeds unity (in absolute terms) does the parent
increase his/her labor supply and thus the demand for public child care. In this
case, the parent is not willing to let his/her consumption level fall by too large an
amount and is therefore forced to extend working hours in order to compensate
for higher fees.
If, however, public child care is ﬁnanced by a use-based fee, β, to be paid
for each hour the child has been in public care, the eﬀect of an increase in β has
no clear eﬀect on either labor supply or child care demand. In order to obtain
some comparative results, we are required to put more structure on the sub-utility
functions u and v and the production function f. This is done in Section 7.
The third alternative to ﬁnance the provision of public child care is a ﬁxed
premium, γ, which has to be paid if, and only if, the child has been in public care.
As long as the parent is willing to work and is thus constrained to use at least
some amount of public child care, this premium acts like a poll tax for the parent.
In order to mitigate the resulting income loss, the parent increases labor supply
and thus the demand for public child care, as γ increases. Correspondingly, both
leisure time spent with and without the child fall.
Finally, the eﬀect of an improvement of public child care quality depends on
whether the quality and the amount of public child care are complements or sub-
stitutes in the (derived) production process of education. If both are complements,
i.e., if the marginal product of an hour shifted from private to public child care
increases with the eﬃciency of public child care, ˆ fdq > 0, which we believe to be12
the more plausible case,3 an enhanced eﬃciency of public child care makes the
parent substitute private by public care, enabling him/her to work more. The
eﬀect on leisure time spent without the child is unclear in general, but at least if v
is separable, pure leisure time increases. The intuition for this result is as follows.
With a higher quality of public child care the necessity to complement public child
care by private child care decreases. For this reason the parent is more inclined
to let the child be supervised publicly. In this way the parent has more time at
his/her discretion, part of which is used for working, part of which is used for
leisure time without the child.
6. Effects on the Child’s Performance
In the preceding sections we have characterized the optimal solution and pro-
vided the corresponding comparative static results for the controls d,h,c, and
l, collected in Propositions 2–4. These results have been obtained under quite
general conditions, the only restriction we imposed, beyond the usual concavity
conditions (i)–(v), is the product of w0 and g to be constant. Comparative static
results for the optimal path of the state variable b are, however, more diﬃcult to
obtain. For this reason, we subsequently specify w and g in such a way that, as





, and g(b) := Ab
σ, (12)
where σ ∈ (0,1) and A > 0. (Note that w(b) converges to ln(b) for σ → 1.) With
this speciﬁcation we obtain w0(b)g(b) = A, and therefore, a unique optimal triple
exists, due to Proposition 1.
Proposition 5. Consider the optimal triple of Proposition 1, and let w and g be
speciﬁed as in eq. (12). The optimal state b∗(t) has the following characteristics
on the discount factor, r, and the weight of the child’s ﬁnal education level, ²:
(A) fc − qfy T 0 ⇒ b∗
r S 0,
(B) fc − qfy T 0 ⇒ b∗
² T 0,
3As we infer from the relationship ˆ fdq = fy +yfyy −dfcy there are quite a few conditions that
guarantee ˆ fdq > 0. For example, if (a) f is separable, fcy = 0, and ‘not too concave’ in y, in the
sense that fy + yfyy > 0 or if (b) private and public child care are (weak) substitutes fcy 6 0
and f is linear in y, we obtain ˆ fdq > 0. In our subsequent examples we use f(c,y) := c+y which
implies ˆ fdq = 1.13
where fc and fy are evaluated along the optimal path.
Proof. See Appendix D. ¤
If private child care activity is more eﬀective in achieving a higher performance
level of the child than is public child care, fc−qfy > 0, an increase in the discount
rate, r, shifts the optimal path of child’s performance downwards. In view of
Proposition 3 this is exactly what we expect, for a higher discount rate lets the
parent work more and spend less time together with the child. Moreover, as we
have already seen in the sequence of Proposition 3, the eﬀect of a higher value of the
child’s ultimate achievement level, ², is just opposite to that of a higher discount
rate. Hence, with more time spent together with the child, its performance will
improve, given that fc − qfy > 0.
With the speciﬁcation of w and g as given in eq. (12), we are also able to char-
acterize the impact of fee policies on the optimal path of the child’s performance,
except for the use-based fee φ = φβ.
Proposition 6. Consider the optimal triple of Proposition 1, and let w and g be
speciﬁed as in eq. (12). The optimal state b∗(t) has the following characteristics
on policy parameters, α, β, γ, and q:
(A) If φ := φα, then (−x∗u00/u0 − 1)(fc − qfy) T 0 ⇒ b∗
α S 0,
(B) If φ := φβ, then the sign of b∗
β is not clear,
(C) If φ := φγ, then fc − qfy T 0 ⇒ b∗
γ S 0,
(D) ˆ fdq(fc − qfy) T 0 ⇒ b∗
q S 0,
where u0, u00, fc, fy, and ˆ fdq are evaluated along the optimal path.
Proof. See Appendix D. ¤
Under an income-based fee, φ = φα, a higher fee (or tax), α, shifts the optimal
path of the child’s achievement level upwards, provided that the elasticity of the
marginal utility of consumption, −x∗u00/u0, is not too large and that private child
care is more productive than public child care, fc−qfy > 0. This merely reﬂects our
previous ﬁndings, see Proposition 4(A), that a higher fee reduces the opportunity
cost of leisure time, inducing the parent to work less and to reduce the demand for
public child care, but to spend more time engaging in leisure activities — both,
with and without the child. Clearly, such behavior of the parent must be beneﬁcial
for the child and thus shifts the optimal path of b upwards.14
In case of a use-based fee system, φ = φβ, little can be said about the eﬀect
of an increase in the fee β on the path of the child’s performance level. Therefore,
we postpone a discussion until speciﬁcations of u, v, and f allow us to draw some
conclusions.
As previously seen, the marginal eﬀects of a ﬂat fee, γ, on the optimal controls
and thus on the path of the state variable are basically opposite to those obtained
under an income-based fee. We know from Proposition 4(C) that a higher ﬁxed
fee for public child care acts as a poll tax for the parent, who seeks to compensate
the induced income loss by an increase in labor supply. The resulting fall in
leisure time spent together with the child then leads to a lower path of the child’s
performance level.
Finally, the eﬀect of an improvement of the quality of public child care, q,
is comparable with that of a higher ﬁxed fee, γ, provided that public child care
(d measured in hours) and its quality (measured by q) are complements in the
(derived) education process, i.e., ˆ fdq > 0. With a higher quality of public child
care the parent is willing to increase both labor supply and the demand for public
child care (cf. Proposition 4(D)). The child’s performance level, however, falls with
less parental child care due to an assumed lower productivity of public child care,
fc − qfy > 0.
7. The Use-based Fee System: An Example
The only comparative static eﬀect which is unclear so far is the impact of the
user fee β in a use-based fee system on the optimal controls and the state variable.
In order to obtain some concrete result, it is useful to specify the utility functions
u and v and the education function f. In Example 1 we consider a possible setting











, f(c,y) := c + y, (13)
where τ ∈ (0,1), satisfying Assumptions (i), (ii), and (iv), and let q = 1. Then
fc − qfy = 0. From Propositions 2 and 3, the unique optimal control depends on
the parameters, α, β, γ, τ, and ω.
Proposition 7. Consider the optimal triple of Proposition 5, together with the
speciﬁcation as given in (13). Let q = 1. Then15
(A) If φ := φβ, then d∗
β < 0, c∗
β > 0, and l∗
β < 0; also h∗
β T 0 ⇔ (ω1/τ + (ω −
β)1/τ)(ω + ω1/τ)τ − ω1/τ(ω1/τ + β) T 0.
(B) If φ := φβ, then b∗
β = 0.
Proof. See Appendix E. ¤
In a use-based system, a higher fee, β, decreases the demand for public child
care and for leisure time spent without the child, but increases the leisure time
spent together with the child. In order to investigate the eﬀect on labor supply,
we set ∆(β) := (ω1/τ + (ω − β)1/τ)(ω + ω1/τ)τ − ω1/τ(ω1/τ + β). Then, we have
∆0 < 0, ∆(0) = ω2/τ(2(ω1−1/τ + 1)τ − 1) which is positive, at least, for τ > 1/2,
and ∆ → −(ω + ω1/τ)ω1/τ(1 − τ) < 0 as β → ω. Therefore, if public child care
is ﬁnanced by a use-based fee, β, the eﬀect of an increase in this fee on labor
supply is not monotonic, that is, it is positive for low fees but negative for high
fees, provided that the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption (and also
of leisure with and without the child) is not too small. Intuitively, in order to
compensate for a higher use-based fee, the parent works more as long as the fee
does not exceed the threshold ¯ β deﬁned by ∆(¯ β) = 0; for a fee exceeding this
threshold, though, he/she spends more time with the child and reduces his/her
labor supply. This leads to a lower demand for public child care along with a lower
amount of leisure time spent without the child.
The impact of the fee β on the optimal path of the child’s performance level
is unclear for an arbitrary level of q. Nevertheless, due to the continuity of the
optimal path of the demand for public child care on the quality, we know from
Part (A) that for q suﬃciently close to unity, we have d∗
β < 0. Together with
the assertion in the proof of Part (B), b∗
β T 0 if −(fc − qfy)d∗
β T 0, we therefore
obtain 1 − q T 0 ⇒ b∗
β T 0, for all q suﬃciently close to unity. In this case, under
a user-fee system, φ = φβ, a higher fee, β, shifts the optimal path of the child’s
performance upwards, provided that the eﬃciency of private child care (which we
normalized to unity) exceeds that of public child care, i.e., 1 > q. This result is
a direct consequence of the decrease in the demand for public child care, which
implies an increase in leisure time spent together with the child. Thus, the eﬀect
of a higher use-based fee is, apart from the eﬀect on l, comparable with the eﬀect
of a higher income-based fee (or tax rate). (See Proposition 6(A). Note that, in
this example, the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption falls short of
unity, for −x∗u00/u0 = τ < 1.)16
For the speciﬁcation given in eq. (13) we illustrate the behavior of the optimal
controls under all three fee systems in Figure 1. Here, we set ω = 1 and τ = 1/2.

























































Figure 1. Interior optimal control over the fee parameter.
8. Relaxing Assumptions: Allowing for Corner Solutions
The assumption, vl(l,c) → ∞ as l → 0+, which excludes l = 0 (d = h) being
optimal, seems to be more restrictive than the other two assumptions, u0(x) → ∞
as x → 0+ and vc(l,c) → ∞ as c → 0+, since in the real world we ﬁnd parents
who have little or no leisure time without the child. We therefore relax the ﬁrst
assumption by considering the case vl(l,c) → n3 < ∞ as l → 0+. This may be
accomplished by the following generalization of Example 1.
Example 2. We assume the same setting as in Example 1 except that we put
v(l,c) := ((l+p)1−τ −1)/(1−τ)+(c1−τ −1)/(1−τ) where p is a positive constant.
Note that Example 1 is recovered as the limiting case when p approaches 0. To










, f(c,y) := c + y, (130)
where p > 0, and let q = 1. Note that this speciﬁcation satisﬁes Assumptions (i)
and (iv) but not Assumption (ii).
Proposition 8. Consider the problem (6)–(11), together with the speciﬁcation as
given in (12) and (130). Let q = 1. Then
(A) If φ := φα, then l∗ ∈ (0,1) or l∗ = 0. Moreover, 1), l∗
p < 0 when l∗ ∈ (0,1),
and 2), for all ω there exists some m1(p) ∈ [0,1) such that l∗ = 0 for all
α 6 m1(p).
(B) If φ := φβ, then l∗ ∈ (0,1) or l∗ = 0. Moreover, 1), l∗
p < 0 when l∗ ∈ (0,1),
and 2), for all ω there exists some m2(p) ∈ [0,ω) such that l∗ = 0 for all
β > m2(p).17
(C) If φ := φγ, then l∗ ∈ (0,1) or l∗ = 0. Moreover, 1), l∗
p < 0 when l∗ ∈ (0,1),
and 2), for all ω there exists some m3(p) ∈ [0,ω) such that l∗ = 0 for all
γ > m3(p).
Proof. See Appendix F. ¤
The ﬁrst parts are intuitive since l and p are perfect substitutes. A higher
value of the parameter p reduces the marginal utility of leisure time without the
child, inducing the parent to spend less time for leisure activities without the
child, regardless of the fee structure. The second parts illustrate how the mode of
ﬁnancing the provision of public child care aﬀects the possibility of zero demand
for leisure time without the child. Notably the eﬀect of an income-based fee (or
tax rate) is opposite to those of a use-based fee and a ﬂat fee. With a lower
income-based fee the opportunity cost of leisure time increases and the parent is
willing to work more. If the value of p is suﬃciently high, leisure time without
the child eventually reaches zero. The same happens if either the use-based fee
β or the ﬂat fee γ increases. In both cases, a negative income eﬀect makes the
parent reduce leisure time spent without the child. This feature is exactly what
we expect from our previous ﬁndings for p = 0, l∗
α > 0, l∗
β < 0, and l∗
γ < 0 (see
Propositions 4(A), 7(A), and 4(C), respectively).
For the speciﬁcation given in eq. (130) we illustrate the dependencies of the
optimal controls on changes of the fee structure and on the value of p in Figure 2.
Here, we again set ω = 1 and τ = 1/2.
9. Conclusion
There is a vast empirical literature on parental labor supply and child care
decisions, but at the same time, very few papers tackle this issue from a theoretical
point of view. Yet, since labor market participation as well as education and child
care decisions are central to labor market and family policies, this issue is too
important to be neglected and not to receive a thorough theoretical analysis. —
In this paper we therefore seek to ﬁll this gap and set up a model of a one parent–
one child household, for which we solve the optimal leisure, labor supply and child
care problem. In this way, labor market participation and child care demand are
simultaneously endogenized and intertemporally determined.18

























































































































































Figure 2. Optimal control over the fee parameter.
Under rather mild conditions parental behavior can be characterized as fol-
lows.4 The time path of both the demand for public child care and labor supply are
increasing. However, with a longer education period, and hence with an extended
time horizon, both time paths are shifted downwards, as the parent enhances at
each instant of time his/her eﬀort to promote the child’s performance by spending
more leisure time together with the child. In other words, while for a given edu-
cation period parental labor supply increases as the child gets older, labor supply
is negatively aﬀected by an extension of this time period during which the child
requires child care.
In order to derive policy conclusions, we investigate the implications of various
public child care policies. In particular we consider three diﬀerent fee schemes,
levied upon the use of public child care services, as well as the eﬃciency level of
public child care as policy instruments. The fee structures we deal with may be
characterized as follows. Either the child care fee is proportional to income, or it is
proportional to the duration the child is in public child care (ﬁxed price per hour),
or a ﬂat fee is levied, that is, a ﬁxed amount has to be paid whenever the child
4In order to derive clear-cut comparative static results for the optimal path of the child’s
performance level, however, we apply some more restrictive assumptions.19
is in public child care. In addition, we also scrutinize the impact of an exogenous
change in the eﬃciency (or quality) of public child care services on labor-, leisure,
child-care decisions. We ﬁnd that these policies aﬀect the parent’s intertemporal
behavior in notably diﬀerent ways.
If the fee for public child care is proportional to income, a higher income ‘tax
rate’, reducing the eﬀective net wage, leads to a decrease in parental labor supply
and thus in the demand for public child care. Under our assumptions, we conclude
that a higher income tax rate shifts the optimal path of the child’s achievement
level upwards. In this sense a higher income-related fee is beneﬁcial for the child
but aﬀects the labor market negatively.
If, as a second alternative, public child care is ﬁnanced by a fee proportional to
the consumption of public child care (use-based fee), an increase in this fee aﬀects
the demand for public child care negatively, while labor supply is positively aﬀected
for low but negatively for high fees. Hence, the compound substitution-income
eﬀect may work in either way. The resulting impact on the path of the child’s
performance, however, is beneﬁcial, irrespective of the value of the fee. Although
these conclusions are obtained under slightly more restrictive assumptions, we may
conclude that a higher use-based fee and a higher income-based fee are comparable
with regard to labor supply, child care demand, and the child’s well-being, given
that the use-based fee is suﬃciently high.
If, however, the provision of public child care is ﬁnanced by a ﬁxed fee, a
higher fee increases both the demand for public child care and parental labor
supply. The path of the child’s performance, however, is negatively aﬀected, as
the parent spends less time together with the child. Remarkably these eﬀects
are opposite to those obtained under an income-based fee system, reﬂecting the
fact that under an income-related fee substitution eﬀects dominate the parent’s
behavior, while under a ﬁxed fee income eﬀects dominate.
Finally, the eﬀect of an improvement of public child care quality induces the
parent to substitute leisure time spent together with the child by public care,
enabling the parent to increase labor supply. This has, however, a negative eﬀect
on the child’s performance. Remarkably, the eﬀect of an improvement of the
eﬃciency of public child care services is (apart from pure leisure time eﬀects)
similar to that of a higher ﬁxed fee.
In order to complement our analysis, we also consider the possibility of cor-
ner solutions, namely of the possibility that leisure time spent without the child20
may drop to zero. — As our analysis shows, even though corner solutions may
materialize, this does not aﬀect our results substantially, however.
To summarize, we ﬁnd that diﬀerent fee systems may induce substantially
diverging eﬀects on labor supply, on the demand for public child care services, and
on the child’s ultimate performance (or education) level. In particular, a trade
oﬀ between an encouragement of labor supply and an enhancement of the child’s
education level exists under almost all policy measures, except in the case of a
small use-based fee. It is important for policy makers to deliberately take into
account these consequences of possible policy measures. Either unexpected eﬀects
may come about or existing trade oﬀs may rule out arriving at two desirable goals
by means of one policy tool.21
Appendix A.
Problem (c.f. Seierstad and Sydsæter (1987, p. 275, p. 291, p. 390)). Let
χ(t) ≡ (χ1(t),...,χn(t)) ∈ Rn be an state vector and ν(t) ≡ (ν1(t),...,νr(t)) ∈ Rr




ζ0(χ(t),ν(t),t)dt + Ψ(χ(t1)), (t0,t1 ﬁxed) (A.1)
subject to the vector diﬀerential equation and the initial condition






i, i = 1,...,n, (χ
1
i all ﬁxed), (A.3)
and subject to the constraints
ξk(ν(t),t) > 0, k = 1,...,s (A.4)
for all t ∈ [t0,t1].
We assume that ζi(χ,ν,t), ∂ζi(χ,ν,t)/∂χj, and ∂ζi(χ,ν,t)/∂νk are continuous
with respect to all the n + r + 1 variables for i = 0,1,...,n; j = 1,...,n; k =
1,...,r, ξk(ν(t),t) and ∂ξk(ν(t),t)/∂νj are continuous with respect to all the r+1
variables for j = 1,...,r; k = 1,...,s, and Ψ is a C1-function. We call (χ(t),ν(t))
an admissible pair if ν(t) is piecewise continuous, χ(t) is continuous and piecewise
continuously diﬀerentiable such that (A.2)–(A.4) are satisﬁed.







t ≡ {k | ξk(ν
∗(t
−),t) = 0,k = 1,...,s}, (A.5)
I
+
t ≡ {k | ξk(ν
∗(t
+),t) = 0,k = 1,...,s}, (A.6)
where ν∗(t−) denotes the left-hand limit of ν∗(t) at t and ν∗(t+) is the correspond-




t 6= ∅, the matrix {∂ξk(ν∗(t−),t)/∂νi},k ∈ I
−
t ,i = 1,...,r has a rank





t 6= ∅, the matrix {∂ξk(ν∗(t+),t)/∂νi},k ∈ I
+
t ,i = 1,...,r has a rank
equal to the number of elements in I
+
t .
(C3) If t = t0, drop (C1), if t = t1, drop (C2).22
Theorem 1 (The maximum principle (c.f. Seierstad and Sydsæter (1987, p. 276,
p. 291, p. 396))). Let (χ∗(t),ν∗(t)) be an admissible pair which solves problem
(A.1)–(A.4). Assume that the constraint qualiﬁcation (C1)–(C3) is satisﬁed. Then
there exist numbers π0 and ρ1,...,ρn, vector functions π(t) ≡ (π1(t),...,πn(t))
and µ(t) ≡ (µ1(t),...,µs(t)), where π(t) is continuous and piecewise continuously
diﬀerentiable and µ(t) piecewise continuous, such that for all t ∈ [t0,t1]:
(I) (π0,ρ1,...,ρn) 6= (0,0,...,0).
(II) H(χ∗(t),ν∗(t),π(t),t) > H(χ∗(t),ν,π(t),t) for all ν such that ξk(ν,t) >






j(t)) 6 0 for all ν = (ν1,...,νr) ∈ ˜ U(t), where
L(χ,ν,π,µ,t) := H +
Ps
k=1 µkξk(ν,t), ∂L∗/∂νj means ∂L/∂νj evaluated





0 for all k,ξk(ν∗(t),t) = 0}.
(IV) µk(t) > 0 (= 0 if ξk(ν∗(t),t) > 0),k = 1,...,s.
(V) ˙ π(t) = −∂L∗/∂χi,i = 1,...,n except at points of discontinuity of ν∗(t),
where ∂L∗/∂χi means ∂L/∂χi evaluated at (χ∗(t),ν∗(t),π(t),µ(t), t).
(VI) π0 = 0 or π0 = 1.
(VII) πi(t1) = π0(∂Ψ(χ∗(t1))/∂χi) +
Pn
k=1 ρk where ρk > 0 (= 0 if χ∗
i(t1) > 0),
i = 1,...,n.
Theorem 2 (Filippov-Cesari (c.f. Seierstad and Sydsæter (1987, p. 285, p. 400))).
Consider the problem (A.1)–(A.4). Assume that
(a) There exists an admissible pair (χ(t),ν(t)).
(b) The set N(χ,t) ≡ {(ζ0(χ,ν,t) + δ,ζ(χ,ν,t)) | δ 6 0,ξ(ν,t) > 0} is convex
for all χ and all t ∈ [t0,t1].
(c) There exists a number κ such that ||χ(t)|| 6 κ for all admissible pairs
(χ(t),ν(t)), and all t ∈ [t0,t1].
(d) There exists an open ball B(0,κ1) ≡ {θ ∈ Rr | ||θ|| < κ1} which, for all χ
with ||χ|| 6 κ and all t ∈ [t0,t1], contains the set U(χ,t) ≡ {ν | ξ(ν,t) > 0}.
Then there exists an optimal pair (χ∗(t),ν∗(t)) (where ν∗(t) is measurable).
Proof of Proposition 1. First, we argue that an optimal solution must lie
in the interior of its admissible domain, viz. in the interior of U ≡ {(d,h) | 1 > d >
0,d > h,h > (βd + γ1d>0)/ωα}. The properties of the utility functions u and v,
formulated in (i) and (ii), namely u0(x) → ∞ as x → 0+, vl(l,c) → ∞ as l → 0+,
and vc(l,c) → ∞ as c → 0+, exclude x = 0, l = 0, and c = 0 being optimal. It23
follows that d∗(t) = 1 cannot be optimal since d∗(t) = 1 ⇒ c∗(t) = 0; and d∗(t) = 0
is ruled out since d∗(t) = 0 ⇒ c∗(t) = 1 ⇒ l∗(t) = 0; also, d∗(t) = h∗(t) is not
optimal since d∗(t) = h∗(t) ⇒ l∗(t) = 0; ﬁnally, h∗(t) = (βd∗(t) + γ)/ωα cannot
be optimal since h∗(t) = (βd∗(t) + γ)/ωα ⇒ x∗(t) = 0. Hence an optimal control
(d∗(t),h∗(t)) belongs to the interior of U, that is, to U◦ ≡ {(d,h) | 1 > d > 0,d >
h,h > (βd + γ)/ωα}.
Since d∗(t) = 0 cannot be optimal, we simply drop the indicator function in
the fee function, φ. Economically, this implies that the parent were to pay the
ﬁxed fees αM(t) and γ irrespective of whether or not public child care is used at
all. The only eﬀect of this modiﬁcation is that it makes the sub-optimal choice
d(t) = 0 even more unattractive, and thus does not aﬀect the optimal control,
whatever it looks like.
With this pre-requisite, we now consider Theorem 1 (necessary conditions for
optimality) for the control problem (6)–(11). Taking account of the form (A.4),
we write ξ1 := 1 − d, ξ2 := d, ξ3 := d − h, and ξ4 := h − (βd + γ)/ωα. Since
(d∗(t),h∗(t)) ∈ U◦, it follows from (IV) that µi = 0,i = 1,2,3,4. Then, deﬁne the







We ﬁrst show that π0 = 1. By b0 > 0, (iv), and (v), we have b∗(t) > 0 for all










0 − vl = 0. (A.9)
This condition is suﬃcient for (II) if H(b∗,d,h,π) = π0 [ˆ u(d,h) + w(b∗)]+π ˆ f(d)g(b∗)
is concave in (d,h), where ˆ u(d,h) := u(ωαh − βd − γ) + v(d − h,1 − d) and
ˆ f(d) := f(1 − d,qd). We show that H(b∗,d,h,π) is strictly concave in (d,h).
First, we obtain ˆ udd = β2u00 + vll − 2vlc + vcc, ˆ udh = −ωαβu00 − vll + vlc, and
ˆ uhh = ωα2u00 + vll. By Assumptions (i) and (ii), we have ˆ udd < 0, ˆ uhh < 0, and
ˆ uddˆ uhh −(ˆ udh)2 = ((ωα −β)2vll +ωα(ωαvcc −2vlc(ωα −β)))u00 +vllvcc −(vlc)2 > 0,
which shows that ˆ u is strictly concave. Second, we obtain ˆ f00 = fcc−2qfcy +q2fyy.
By Assumption (iv), ˆ f00 6 0, and thus ˆ f is concave. Last, with the above results,
π0 = 1, and g(b∗) > 0, it remains to be shown that π > 0.5 We claim that π(t) > 0
5A nonnegative combination of concave functions is also concave.24
for all t ∈ [0,T]. Suppose that π(t1) 6 0 for some t1. It follows from (VII) with
b∗(T) > 0, π0 = 1, and (iii), that π(T) > 0. Then, by continuity, there exists some













This equation yields ˙ π(t2) = −w0(b∗(t2)) < 0, which is contradiction. Therefore
π(t) > 0 for all t, and we conclude that H(b∗,d,h,π) is strictly concave in (d,h).
Next, we show that the necessary conditions yield a unique candidate for
(b∗(t),d∗(t),h∗(t)). To this end, deﬁne z(t) ≡ g(b(t))π(t), and Hz(b,d,h,z) ≡
H(b,d,h,z/g(b)). Then z∗(t) = g(b∗(t))π(t) > 0. By ˙ z∗ = g0(b∗)˙ b∗π + g(b∗)˙ π and
eqs (7) and (A.10), we obtain ˙ z∗ = rz∗ − w0(b∗)g(b∗). Then, by the assumption in
Proposition 1, we have ˙ z∗ = rz∗−C. On the other hand, multiplying both sides of
the condition π(T)−²w0(b∗(T)) = 0 by g(b∗(T)) yields z∗(T)−²w0(b∗(T))g(b∗(T)) =
0. Again, by the assumption, we obtain z∗(T) − ²C = 0. The solution to ˙ z∗ =






−r(T−t) + 1). (A.11)
Recall that H(b∗,d,h,π), and thus Hz(b∗,d,h,z∗) is strictly concave in (d,h), and




0 + vl − vc + (−fc + qfy)z





0 − vl = 0. (A.13)
Then, by the implicit function theorem, the above system has a unique solution
(d∗,h∗) = (dz(z∗),hz(z∗)). Substituting z∗ = ˜ z∗(t) into the solution, we get a
control (d∗(t),h∗(t)) = (dz(˜ z∗(t)),hz(˜ z∗(t))). Then, by concavity of g and the
standard existence theorem, the solution to the initial value problem (7) and (9)
with the control d = d∗ exists and, by the usual uniqueness theorem, is unique
(see, e.g., Seierstad and Sydsæter (1987, Appendix A) for such theorems). We
can now conclude that the necessary conditions provide a unique candidate for
(b∗(t),d∗(t),h∗(t)).
In order to show that this candidate is indeed optimal, we apply Theorem 2.
We verify that the conditions (a)–(d) are satisﬁed: Set (d(t),h(t)) ≡ (¯ d,¯ h) ∈ U◦.
The solution of the initial value problem (7) and (9) with d = ¯ d is denoted by
¯ b(t). The existence of ¯ b(t) is established by concavity of g and the standard
existence theorem for ordinary diﬀerential equations. From Assumptions (iv) and25
(v) together with ¯ b(t) > 0 it follows that an admissible triple (¯ b(t), ¯ d,¯ h) exists. The
set N is given by N(b,t) = {(e−rt(ˆ u(d,h)+w(b))+δ, ˆ f(d)g(b)) | δ 6 0,(1−d,d,d−
h,h − (βd + γ)/ωα) > 0}. The concavity of ˆ u and ˆ f implies that the set N(b,t)
is convex for all (b,t), which can be proved in the same way as in Seierstad and
Sydsæter (1987, p. 134, Example 9)). The condition (c) follows from the concavity
of g and the standard existence theorem for ordinary diﬀerential equations. It is
clear that U(b,t) is bounded. We therefore conclude that, by Theorem 2, an
optimal triple (b∗(t),d∗(t),h∗(t)) exists.6 Hence, the unique candidate produced
by the necessary conditions is optimal. ¤
Appendix B.
Proof of Proposition 2. We ﬁrst consider the optimal control (d∗(t),h∗(t)).
To prove part (A), recall that d∗(t) = dz(˜ z∗(t)) and h∗(t) = hz(˜ z∗(t)), and then
˙ d∗ = dz0(˜ z∗)˙ ˜ z∗ and ˙ h∗ = hz0(˜ z∗)˙ ˜ z∗. First, by eq. (A.11), ˙ ˜ z∗ = C(r² − 1)e−r(T−t).























−1 is the inverse of the Jacobian matrix of (Hz
d,Hz
h) evaluated along
the optimal path, whose elements are all negative since Hz∗
dd = ˆ udd + z∗ ˆ f00 < 0,
Hz∗
hh = ˆ uhh < 0, and |J∗| = Hz∗
ddHz∗
hh − (Hz∗
dh)2 > 0 by strict concavity, and Hz∗
dh =
ˆ udh = −ωαβu00 − vll + vlc > 0 by Assumption (ii). Part (B) follows from eq. (B.1)
and the fact that ˜ z∗
T = −C(r² − 1)e−r(T−t).
We next consider the optimal control (c∗(t),l∗(t)). The result for c∗(t) is
immediate from the above result together with c∗(t) = 1 − d∗(t) for all t. For the
result for l∗(t) we use l∗(t) = d∗(t)−h∗(t) for all t implying ˙ l∗(t) = ˙ d∗(t)− ˙ h∗(t) =
(dz0(˜ z∗) − hz0(˜ z∗)) ˙ ˜ z∗. Substituting from eq. (B.1) and using ωα > β and vlc = 0
yields the result. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3. We ﬁrst consider the optimal control (d∗(t),h∗(t)).
Using d∗(t) = dz(˜ z∗(t)) and h∗(t) = hz(˜ z∗(t)), both parts follow from eqs (A.11)









/r2 < 0 and ˜ z∗
² = Cre−r(T−t) > 0. The latter is clear. The former
6We assume here that the optimal control is piecewise continuous. Regarding the risks of
this assumption and the necessary changes if we allow the control only to be measurable, see
Seierstad and Sydsæter (1987, p. 132-133, p. 276, p. 285).26
may be seen as follows. Let p1(r) := er(T−t) − 1 and p2(r) := r(1 − r²)(T − t),
Then, ˜ z∗
r < 0 ⇔ p1(r) > p2(r). It is immediate that p1(0) = p2(0) = 0 and
p0
1(0) = p0
2(0) = T − t. Finally, since p00
1(r) > 0 and p00
2(r) < 0, we conclude
p1(r) > p2(r).
We next consider the optimal control (c∗(t),l∗(t)). The proof follows imme-
diately from the above result together with the relations c∗(t) = 1 − d∗(t) and
l∗(t) = d∗(t) − h∗(t) for all t. ¤
Appendix C.
Proof of Proposition 4. We ﬁrst consider the optimal control (d∗(t),h∗(t)).
Let J∗ be given as in the proof of Proposition 2, and let Jα∗ := J∗|β=0,γ=0, Jβ∗ :=
J∗|α=0,γ=0, and Jγ∗ := J∗|α=0,β=0. The results follow from an application of the





































































































where we treated α,β and γ as additional arguments of all functions.
We next consider the optimal control (c∗(t),l∗(t)). The proof follows imme-
diately from the above result together with the relations c∗(t) = 1 − d∗(t) and
l∗(t) = d∗(t) − h∗(t) for all t. ¤
Appendix D.
Proof of Proposition 5. When g(b) := Abσ, eq. (7) with d = d∗ is a








This means that b∗
r T 0 if −(fc − qfy)d∗
r T 0, and b∗
² T 0 if −(fc − qfy)d∗
² T 0.
From this, together with Proposition 3, (A) and (B) follow. ¤
Proof of Proposition 6. Similar to the proof of Proposition 5. ¤27
Appendix E.
Proof of Proposition 7. We ﬁrst prove part (A). We have d∗ = (ω +
ω1/τ)/(ω+ω1/τ+ω1/τ(ω−β)1−1/τ) and h∗ = (β+ω1/τ)/(ω+ω1/τ+ω1/τ(ω−β)1−1/τ).
Then it is straightforward to show that d∗
β < 0, and h∗
β T 0 ⇔ (ω1/τ + (ω −
β)1/τ)(ω + ω1/τ)τ − ω1/τ(ω1/τ + β) T 0. Finally, l∗
β < 0 and c∗
β > 0 are easily
veriﬁed from the relations l∗(t) = d∗(t) − h∗(t) and c∗(t) = 1 − d∗(t) for all t,
respectively. Part (B) follows, together with fc − qfy = 0, from the assertion
b∗
β T 0 if −(fc − qfy)d∗
β T 0. See the proof of Proposition 5. ¤
Appendix F.
Proof of Proposition 8. The process establishing the existence of a unique
optimal triple is similar to that in the proof of Proposition 1 and is therefore omit-
ted. The only diﬀerence is that the restriction d − h > 0 can be active. First, let
φ := φα. The optimal control, l∗ = d∗ − h∗, is given by l∗ = max{lα(α,τ,ω,p),0}
where lα := (1−p(1+((1−α)ω)−1+1/τ))/(2+((1−α)ω)−1+1/τ). Then, it is immedi-
ate that lα
p < 0. Moreover, it follows that lα T 0 ⇔ α T 1−(−1+1/p)τ/(1−τ)/ω =:
αc(p), and then αc0 > 0, αc(1/(1 + ω−1+1/τ)) = 0, and αc → 1 as p → 1. Second,
let φ := φβ. The optimal control is given by l∗ = max{lβ(β,τ,ω,p),0} where
lβ := (ω − β − pω1/τ(1 + (ω − β)1−1/τ))/(ω + ω1/τ + ω1/τ(ω − β)1−1/τ). Then, it
is clear that lβ
p < 0. Moreover, it follows that lβ T 0 ⇔ β S βc(p) such that
ω −βc(p)−pω1/τ(1+(ω −βc(p))1−1/τ) = 0, and then βc0 < 0, βc → ω as p → 0+,
and βc(1/(1 + ω−1+1/τ)) = 0. Last, let φ := φγ. The optimal control is given by
l∗ = max{lγ(γ,τ,ω,p),0} where lγ := (ω −γ −p(ω +ω1/τ))/(2ω +ω1/τ). Then, it
is obvious that lγ
p < 0. Moreover, it follows that lγ T 0 ⇔ γ S ω − p(ω + ω1/τ) =:
γc(p), and then γc0 < 0, γc → ω as p → 0+, and γc(1/(1 + ω−1+1/τ)) = 0. ¤28
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